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Abstract. Watermarking techniques are used to help identifying copies
of publicly released information. They consist in applying a slight and
secret modification to the data before its release, in a way that should
be robust, i.e., remain recognizable even in (reasonably) modified copies
of the data. In this paper, we present new results about the robust-
ness of watermarking schemes against arbitrary attackers, and the for-
malization of those results in Coq. We used the Alea library, which
formalizes probability theory and models probabilistic programs using
a simple monadic translation. This work illustrates the strengths and
particularities of the induced style of reasoning about probabilistic pro-
grams. Our technique for proving robustness is adapted from methods
commonly used for cryptographic protocols, and we discuss its relevance
to the field of watermarking.
1 Introduction
Watermarking consists in embedding some information inside a document in
a robust and usually imperceptible way. It is notably used in digital property
claims: a content owner may mark a document before its release, in order to be
able to recognize copies of it and claim ownership. Of course, this cannot be done
in a reliable and convincing way unless properties of the watermarking scheme
have been solidly established.
A wide literature is dedicated to techniques for marking sound, still images
and videos [7] that are robust against common transformations such as scal-
ing, resampling, cropping, etc. This is achieved by using meaningful notions of
distance and performing watermarking in an adequate space, such as frequency
spectrums. One may also consider documents as unstructured bit strings, and
measure distortions using the Hamming distance, i.e., the number of positions
where bits differ. In this setting, simple watermarking techniques may be used.
The bit-flipping scheme involves a secret mask K which is a bitstring of the same
length as the original document that is to be marked. Marking a document O
(called support in this context) is done by changing the value of bits at positions
set in K — we say a position is set when the corresponding bit is 1. This can
⋆ Work partially supported by SCALP project ANR-07-SESU-010.
2be expressed as a bitwise xor: mark(K,O) = O ⊕K. The induced distortion is
the number k of bits set in K; this quantity is typically chosen to be a small
fraction of the size of the support, and its value is assumed to be public. De-
tection of suspect copies O′, written detect(O,K,O′), is done by counting the
number of positions set in K where O and O′ differ — in other words, the num-
ber of positions set in K where O′ coincides with mark(K,O). If that number
exceeds a predefined threshold, the suspect document O′ is claimed to be a copy
of mark(K,O). The idea behind this scheme is that an attacker who does not
know K has little chance of changing enough bits for evading detection unless it
also distorts the document so much that it renders it worthless. A variant of this
technique is substitution watermarking where, instead of flipping bits at chosen
positions in the original support, a secret message is used as a substitution for
those bits. It is important to point out that although working with unstructured
bitstrings is idealized, it has practical counterparts. For instance, the Agrawal,
Haas and Kiernan’s method [2] for watermarking numerical databases hides a
mark by applying a substitution to least significant bits, and quality measure-
ment is proportional to the Hamming distance.
Watermarked documents may be subject to attacks by malevolent users. A
protocol is said to be robust against a particular attack if the mark can still be de-
tected with high probability in copies modified by this attack. As observed above,
it is useless to consider attacks that introduce excessive distortion: though such
attacks are usually easy, they result in valueless data. Numerous attack scenarios
can be envisioned, and it is impossible to test them all one by one. Neverthe-
less, we expect a protocol to be provably robust, i.e., robust against any attack.
Provable security for watermarking is difficult to achieve, and there is currently
little work in that direction. One reason for this is that watermarking protocols
may be attacked at various levels, sometimes independently of the nature of
documents and the marking algorithms. For example, in the context of digital
property, someone may apply his own mark to marked data in order to claim
ownership. To resolve such issues, authorities have to be introduced. To address
such issues separately, Hopper, Molnar and Wagner [9] have introduced a dis-
tinction between strong watermarking schemes and non-removable embeddings.
The former refers to the general protocol used to claim ownership, while the
latter is the core technique for marking documents, consisting of a marking and
a detection algorithms. Using cryptography and trusted third parties, they have
formally proved (on paper) that strong watermarking protocols, robust against
arbitrary attackers, can be derived from non-removable embeddings. However,
they did not address the robustness of particular embedding techniques, which
depends on the kind of document that is considered. More generally, there is
surprisingly little literature on robustness against arbitrary attackers, even in
the idealized setting of bitstring algorithms. The problem has been identified,
and several authors have proposed definitions and methodologies [1, 11], but they
did not provide proofs of their results even for simple schemes. To the best of
our knowledge, the only such proof has been carried out in the context of graph
watermarking [12]. This proof relies on complex assumptions, concerning in par-
3ticular the limited knowledge of the attacker, which may be hard to formalise.
In contrast, our approach is very elementary, relying on a clear modelisation and
basic combinatorics. We also note that, although a central piece in that proof
of robustness for graphs is the (proved) robustness of a technique for marking
integer vectors, this latter technique is not suitable for marking bitstrings under
the Hamming distance, since it applies a modification to each component of the
vector — which also eases considerably the robustness argument.
In this paper, we make two important steps towards provably secure water-
marking protocols. First, we present a new proof of robustness against arbitrary
attackers, which applies to bit-flipping and substitution watermarking for bit-
strings. The key idea here is an efficient reduction of robustness to secrecy of
the key K, which is used to obtain a tight enough bound on the probability of
successful attacks. Second, we have fully formalized these proofs using the Coq
proof assistant and the Alea library for reasoning about probabilities and prob-
abilistic programs. Therefore, we provide a solid methodology for further work
in the area. The formalization of our work is also interesting in that it involves
aspects such as knowledge and probabilistic algorithms which are challenging for
the formal methods community. There are indeed few significant formalisations
of randomised programs, although this field is receiving increasing attention [3,
8, 10]. Our work is most closely related to the Certicrypt framework [4, 5] for
formalizing proofs of cryptographic protocols. Those proofs proceed by reducing
cryptographic games to simpler ones corresponding to mathematical assump-
tions on cryptographic primitives. As we shall see, our work on watermarking
does not necessitate a model as complex as the one used in Certicrypt. But
the main difference lies in the nature of our proofs: while our argument also
revolves around a reduction, it does not rely as heavily on program transfor-
mations but instead on concrete computations on bitstrings. The end result is
also quite different: our proof is self-contained and does not rely on assumptions
about complex mathematical primitives. Therefore, our Coq development pro-
vides an interesting case study forAlea, showing how elements of computational
information theory may be carried out in that framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we motivate
high-level modelization choices and present the Alea library which is used to
formally realize these choices in Coq. Then, we describe our robustness proof in
Section 3, detailing the main steps of the reduction for bit-flipping watermarking,
and showing how it applies to substitution watermarking as well. We conclude
by discussing our results and directions for future work in Section 4.
2 Modelization
Security properties are commonly expressed as games opposing the implementa-
tion of a service to an attacker. This methodology has the advantage of providing
a clear and concrete characterisation of the flaw we want to avoid. We shall thus
define the robustness property by means of a game. We assume that dist repre-
sents the distance between two objects and that detect(O,K,O′) is true when
4O′ is a marked copy of O with key K. An attacker A will break the robustness of
a watermarking scheme when the following game answers true, i.e., the attacker
produced an object close to the original one and the mark is no longer detected:
O′ ← mark(K,O)
O′′ ← A(O′)
dist(O′, O′′) < γ ∧ ¬detect(O,K,O′′)
Of course, attacking watermarking schemes in this game is usually going to
be easy unless we assume that the attacker does not know K and O. Other
parameters affect the difficulty and meaning of our game, most notably the
degree of abstraction of the model and the assumptions on the computational
ressources of the attacker. Investigating these parameters is crucial to make a
meaningful modelization.
Symbolic models, where secrets are perfect and cannot be guessed, can be
used to reveal security breaches in some protocols. However, their high level of
abstraction would trivialize the study of watermarking schemes. We are inter-
ested in quantifying how hard it is for an attacker to remove a mark, potentially
relying on random choices and leaked information. In order to do this, we place
ourselves in a probabilistic computational model where secrets are regular data
that has been randomly chosen and may therefore be guessed by another party.
In that context, our robustness game can be rephrased as follows, where all
computations are probabilistic:
O ← random support()
K ← random key()
O′ ← mark(K,O)
O′′ ← A(O′)
dist(O′, O′′) < γ ∧ ¬detect(O,K,O′′)
The computational ressources available to the attacker are also a very im-
portant parameter of security games. In the case of cryptography, security often
relies on the (supposed) hardness of a few problems: for example, inverting a
logarithm is essentially as hard as guessing its argument. Under such circum-
stances, it is possible for an attacker to succeed if it is allowed to compute long
enough, but security can be preserved if the time needed is exponential in a
parameter that can be choosen at will, typically the size of the secret key. The
case of watermarking differs a lot. In that context, the size of the key is limited
by the support, and does not offer good control on the computational cost of
an attack. However, this does not matter because this cost is in fact irrelevant.
Unlike in cryptography, there is (usually) no way for the attacker to know if he
succeeded. Therefore, all we have to do is make sure that the attacker has a low
probability of guessing, because he is only allowed a single chance. As a result,
we will impose no constraint on the time or space that our attacker may use.
Thus, in order to establish robustness, all we need is the notion of probabil-
ity and probabilistic programs. Since we do not make restrictions on the use of
ressources in our games, they can also be modelled by probabilistic algorithms.
5For our formalization in Coq, the ALEA library already provides all the funda-
mental elements.
2.1 ALEA
Alea is a Coq library containing a formalisation of cpos, of the unit interval
U ([0; 1]), of probability theory, and tools for reasoning about probabilistic pro-
grams. We quickly recall some of the key concepts used in Alea. More details
can be found in [3].
A standard, deterministic program of type A evaluates to a single value of
type A. A probabilistic program may evaluate to different values in different
runs, defining a probability distribution over A. This is the approach taken in
Alea, which provides machinery for building such distributions in a functional
programming style, using a monadic interpretation.
A probabilistic program of type A is thus viewed as a distribution, i.e., a
Coq object of type distr A. The distribution may also be called a measure, or
experiment. It is something that one can integrate over: it roughly has the type
(A→ [0; 1])→ [0; 1], taking a weight function over A and returning its sum over
the measure. The integral
∫
f dP is written mu P f in Coq (we also use the
notation µ P f). Given a property Q on A, let 1Q be the function which is 1
when Q holds and 0 otherwise, then µ P 1Q represents the probability that the
output of program P satisfies Q. The distribution P comes with some properties,
e.g., it must be guaranteed to preserve addition, µ P (f+g) = (µ P f)+(µ P g).
The basic programming constructs for randomized computation include:
– return a which given a : A, returns the Dirac’s distribution at point a;
– let x = d1 in d2 which given a probabilistic program d1 of type distr A
and a probabilistic program d2 of type distr B depending on x of type A,
evaluates d1, bind the resulting value to x and then evaluates d2.
As an example of Alea, we shall show how to encode probabilistic Turing ma-
chines. We need a set Σ of states and a set A of letters. A predicate accept of
type Σ → bool distinguishes accepting states. The output of a transition will
be a record {next : Σ; write : A; move : dir} with dir the type of directions
with two values L and R. A transition is a function trans which takes a state
and a letter as arguments and gives an output. The configuration of the machine
is given by a state, a tape and the current position of the tape, it is represented
by a record {cur : Σ; tape : Z→ A; pos : Z}.
It is trivial to define a deterministic function update which given a configu-
ration and an output produces the new configuration.
The Turing machine itself works as a program which recursively applies tran-
sitions and stops when it reaches an accepting state:
let rec run m = if accept (cur m) then return m
else let o = trans (cur m) (tape m (pos m)) in run (update m o)
For the deterministic case, we cannot define this function in general in Coq
because there is no way to guarranty the termination of the fixpoint.
6In Alea however, the type distr A includes sub-probabilities (µ P 1 <
1) which models possibly non terminating programs. Consequentely, this type
has a cpo-structure and any monotonic continuous operator of type (A →
distr B) → A → distr B has a fixpoint. In order to model probabilitic
Turing machines, we just have to see the transition function as a probabilitic
transformation: trans : Σ → A → distr output and interpret the previ-
ous definition of run as a function of type config → distr config using the
monadic constructions for return and let and the general fixpoint on distribu-
tions.
Starting from an initial configuration m0, we can measure the probability for
the machine to terminate, it will be given by the expression µ (runm0) 1.
In the development of the watermarking algorithms, we only define simple
probabilistic programs using structural recursion. However, the robustness of a
watermarking scheme will be established using a quantification over all possible
attackers. It is important to make sure that our formalization covers everybody.
The main restriction of our model is that random primitives are limited to dis-
crete distributions. However this is sufficent for modeling probabilistic Turing
machines, because we only need to express a distribution on outputs which is a
finite set. Thus, our formalization in Coq is adequate: any probabilistic attack
can be expressed in our framework, and is thus covered by our results.
2.2 Reasoning with ALEA
We shall describe a simple proof, establishing that some function implements the
uniform probability law on bit vectors of a given length. We define the BVrandom
function which given a natural number n, computes uniformly a bit vector of
size n. It is defined by structural induction on n, using the Flip program which
returns true with probability 1
2
and false otherwise:
Fixpoint BVrandom n : distr (Bvector n) :=
match n with
| 0 ⇒ return Bnil
| Sm⇒ let hd = Flip in let tl = BVrandom m in return (Vcons hd tl)
end
Then we seek to show that BVrandom implements a uniform distribution
which means that the probability that BVrandom n returns a particular vector
x of length n is 2−n. Formally, it is written as follows where BVeq is a boolean
function testing the equality of two bit vectors and B2U is the conversion of
booleans to 0 and 1 in the set U.
Theorem BVrandom eq : ∀n (x : Bvector n),
µ (BVrandom n) (fun y ⇒ B2U (BVeq y x)) == [1/2]n.
The interpretation of randomized programs as measures gives us a direct way
to establish such a result by using simple algebraic transformations following the
structure of the program. Example of transformations are:
7– µ (return x) f == f x ,
– µ Flip f == [1/2]× f true+ [1/2]× f false,
– µ (let x = P in Q x) f == µ P (fun x⇒ µ (Q x) f)
The BVrandom function is defined by structural induction on n, thus we naturally
reason on it by induction on n or (preferably) on the vector x. The base case
is trivial: BVrandom 0 computes to return Bnil and both sides simplify to 1,
so we can invoke reflexivity. When the list has a head and tail, we unfold
the computation of BVrandom (S n) and simplify the obtained measure to make
µ (BVrandom n) f (almost) appear as:
[1/2]× µ (BVrandom n) (fun y ⇒ B2U (BVeq (Vcons true y) (Vcons a x)))+
[1/2]× µ (BVrandom n) (fun y ⇒ B2U (BVeq (Vcons false y)(Vcons a x)))
== [1/2]Sn
We can conclude by doing a case analysis to compare the heads of those lists,
followed by the invocation of the induction hypothesis, some simplifications (no-
tably killing the branch where a is not the correct head) and finally we obtain
equalities on measures and on reals in U which are solved automatically.
In the rest of the paper, we omit most occurrences of B2U, implicitly treat
decidable propositions (e.g., BVeq x y) as booleans, and we simply write P(e) for
µ e B2U, which represents the probability that e returns true when e is a prob-
abilistic program computing a boolean, i.e., a Coq object of type distr bool.
3 Proof of robustness
We shall now present our results. They have been fully formalised using Coq
version 8.3, the AAC plugin [6] for reasoning modulo associativity commutativ-
ity, and version 7 of the ALEA library which benefited from several contributions
as part of this work. The full development can be downloaded or replayed online
at http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/~dbaelde/watermarking/.
Our proof follows the main language-based technique for proving properties
against arbitrary attackers: we reduce robustness to the simpler property of
secrecy of the key. In the following, we detail the main steps of our proof for the
bit flipping scheme: we first quantify secrecy, then use an efficient reduction of
robustness to secrecy, and finally show that the obtained bound is exponentially
small in the size of the support. For each step, we provide the informal argument
and discuss how this argument carries to the Coq formalization. Finally, we
observe that the substitution algorithm can in fact be treated in the exact same
fashion.
3.1 Operations on bit vector
Since our algorithms rely heavily on bit vectors, we had to develop libraries for
common bit vector operations, both deterministic and probabilistic. This part
8of our formalization is mostly straightforward. It benefited a lot from reasoning
modulo associativity and commutativity, and we also used type classes to reflect
the boolean algebra structure that bit vectors inherit from booleans.
In this paper, we shall use the following notations, which depart slighty from
our Coq notations. If X and Y are bit vectors of same length, X ⊕ Y , X &Y
and X ‖Y respectively denote bit-wise xor, conjunction and disjunction, and
¬X is the bit-wise negation of X. The number of bits set to 1 in X is |X|1. The
Hamming distance dist X Y is defined as |X ⊕ Y |1. We also define |X \ Y |1 as
|X &¬Y |1: it counts the number of bits set in X but not in Y .
We defined a couple of uniform random generators: BVrandom n returns a
bit vector of length n; BVrandom k k n returns a vector of length n with k bits
set; BVrandom k mask k M returns a vector of the same length as the mask M ,
having k bits set, only at positions whereM is also set. This last function is used
to randomly modify a vector, in a uniform way that is interesting to consider
more closely.
Lemma 1 (RandomBV.correct eq). We define a correction function that takes
a vector X, removes i bits among those set in X and adds m among those not
set.
correct X i m :=


let I = BVrandom k mask i X in
let M = BVrandom k mask m (¬X) in
return ((X &¬I) ‖M)
For any bit vectors K and K ′ of length n, correct K ′ |K ′\K|1 |K\K
′|1 returns
K with the following probability:
(
|K ′ \K|1
|K ′|1
)−1(
|K \K ′|1
n− |K ′|1
)−1
Proof. Our lemma simply says that choices of I and M in the correction are
independent, and thus the probability of sucess is the product of the probabilities
of finding the two right vectors. However, the corresponding Coq proof turns
out to be quite interesting. The key point is that we do not use conditional
probabilities to express independence, but rely instead on the structure of the
distribution (that is, the probabilistic program) to make independence explicit.
After unfolding a few constructs, and writing i for |K ′ \ K|1 and m for
|K \K ′|1, the probability that we are considering is the following:
µ (BVrandom k mask i K ′) (λI.
µ (BVrandom k mask m (¬K ′)) (λM.
K = (K ′&¬I) ‖M))
One can show that BVrandom k mask k X always ranges among vectors Y
such that |Y \X|1 = 0. This can be used (twice) to enrich our expression:
µ (BVrandom k mask i K ′) (λI. (|I \K ′|1 = 0) ×
µ (BVrandom k mask m (¬K ′)) (λM. (|M \ (¬K ′)|1 = 0) ×
(K = (K ′&¬I) ‖M)))
9By the stability of distributions under scalar multiplication, we can push
multiplications under µ constructs, at which point we observe that (|I \K ′|1 =
0)∧(|M \(¬K ′)|1 = 0)∧(K = (K
′&¬I) ‖M) is equivalent to (I = (K ′&¬K))∧
(M = (K &¬K ′)). This relies on basic boolean algebra, proved notably by
observing that for any two vectors u and v of size n, u& v = 0 implies u&¬v = u.
Thus, we have simplified our probability distribution as follows:
µ (BVrandom k mask i K ′) (λI.
µ (BVrandom k mask m (¬K ′)) (λM.
(I = (K ′&¬K))× (M = (K &¬K ′))))
In other words, we have succeeded in splitting the result of our computation
in two independent parts, one for each probabilistic variable. Using the stability
under multiplication in the opposite direction as before, we can thus split the
whole computation in two:(
µ (BVrandom k mask i K ′) (λI. (I = (K ′&¬K))
)
×
(
µ (BVrandom k mask m (¬K ′)) (λM. (M = (K &¬K ′))
)
From there, it is easy to conclude by uniformity of our choice primitive.
3.2 Bit flipping watermarking
We now define the bit flipping watermarking scheme and its two security prop-
erties by means of games. Our definitions rely on a few parameters, which are
considered public: n is the size of the mask and support; k is the number of
marked bits; δ is the detection threshold, i.e., a message is considered marked
if it has more than δ marked bits; γ is the deformation threshold, i.e., two mes-
sages are considered indistinguishable if their Hamming distance is less than
γ. Obviously, those four parameters should be strictly positive integers. More
assumptions will be introduced after the definitions.
For bit flipping on supports of size n, the key is a mask with only k bits set
to 1, marking is done by flipping the bits set in the mask, and the number of
marked bits in O′ is the number of positions set in K where O′ and O differ.
genkey := BVrandom k n k
mark K O := K ⊕O
#marks O K O′ := |K &(O ⊕O
′)|1
We then give games defining robustness and secrecy. Robustness is the ability
to resist unmarking challenges, where the attacker is given a marked message and
has to return an unmarked message that is indistinguishable from the marked
one:
unmark A :=


let K = genkey in
let O = BVrandom n in
let O′ = mark K O in
let O′′ = A O′ in
return (dist O′ O′′ < γ & #marks O K O′′ < δ)
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Secrecy is the impossibility for an attacker to guess the key, given only a marked
message:
find mask A :=


let K = genkey in
let O = BVrandom n in
let O′ = mark K O in
let K ′ = A O′ in
return (K = K ′)
Finally, we make the following natural assumptions on our parameters:
δ ≤ k ∧ γ ≤ n ∧ k ≤ γ + δ ∧ 2k ≤ n (1)
The first two require that the detection threshold is less than the number of
marked bits, and that the deformation threshold is less than the support size.
Values of δ and γ outside these ranges would be meaningless; another way to
put it is that bounding them by k and n respectively does not change the prob-
lem at all. The third equation is more interesting: it states that an attack is
possible. Indeed a successful attack must alter more than k− δ bits. Finally, the
last inequality states that less than half of the bits should be marked. This is
obviously desirable for a watermarking application. In any case, if more than
half of the bits are marked, the problem is more simply attacked by trying to
find the unmarked bits and we are back to a situation where the constraint is
satisfied.
3.3 Secrecy
We prove that the key does not leak through marking: the knowledge of marked
messages does not allow to mount a better attack than the blind attack consisting
of guessing the key from scratch. While the proof of this first lemma would
be deemed straightforward on paper, its formalization reveals a few interesting
steps.
Lemma 2 (Xor analysis.secrecy). Guessing the key given a marked support
is as hard as a blind guess:
∀A, P(find mask A) ≤
(
n
k
)−1
Proof. By definition, find mask A is:
µ genkey (λK. µ (BVrandom n) (λO. µ (K ⊕O) (λO′.
µ (A O′) (λK ′. return (K = K ′)))))
The key observation is that for any vector K, the distribution K⊕BVrandom n is
equal to BVrandom n. This is proved in RandomBV.BVxor noise by induction on
the size of vectors and straightforward computation on the distributions. Using
it, we can rewrite find mask A as follows:
µ genkey (λK. µ (BVrandom n) λO′.
µ (A O′) (λK ′. return (K = K ′))))
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From there, the proof is routine: we simply need to permute the various
choices to make it explicit that A is blindly guessing the outcome of the uniform
choice genkey. In Alea, the permutation of probabilistic let-definitions is not
trivial, as it corresponds to commuting integrals. However, it always holds for
discrete distributions, and our distributions are indeed discrete because their
domain itself is so. So we can permute the definition of K under that of O′ and
K ′, and use the uniformity of genkey, that is BVrandom k:

µ (BVrandom n) (λO
′.
µ (A O′) (λK ′.
µ genkey (λK. K = K ′)))

 ≤

µ (BVrandom n) (λO
′.
µ (A O′) (λK ′.
1/
(
n
k
)
))


From there, we conclude easily by simplifying the right hand-side program into
1/
(
n
k
)
multiplied by the probabilities that BVrandom n and A O′ terminate.
3.4 Robustness
We now proceed to reduce robustness to secrecy. Given an attacker that can
unmark messages, we build an attack on the key that runs the attack on the
mark, considers the changes as an estimation of the key, and randomly attempts
to correct it in order to obtain the secret key. In order to do this efficiently,
we first bound the error on the estimated key, and then show that it suffices to
guess the error to know how many bits are incorrectly set and how many bits
are missing in the estimated key.
For the next two lemmas, we consider a run of an attack on the mark. Let K
be a mask, i.e., a vector of size n satisfying |K|1 = k. Let O be an arbitrary vector
of size n, and O′ be mark K O. Let O′′ be another vector of size n, representing
the attackers’ attempt at removing the mark, and let ka = dist O
′ O′′ be the
number of attacked bits. We define K ′ to be O′ ⊕ O′′. From the viewpoint of
considering this set of changes as an approximation of K, we define the error e
to be dist K K ′, the number of incorrect bits ki to be |K
′ \K|1 (these are the
bits set to 1 in K ′ but not in K, they have no influence on mark detection but
affect distortion) and the number of missing bits km to be |K \K
′|1 (these are
the bits which are 0 in K ′ but 1 in K so where the mark is not removed). We
finally define the number of correct bits kc to be k − km (these are the bits set
to 1 in both K and K ′).
Lemma 3 (Maximum error emax). If the attack succeeds, i.e., dist O
′ O′′ <
γ and #marks O K O′′ < δ, then dist K K ′ < emax where emax := γ+2δ−k.
Proof. The hypothesis #marks O K O′′ < δ gives us km < δ. We also observe
that dist K K ′ = ki+km, and ki+kc = |K
′|1 = dist O
′ O′′ < γ. We conclude
that dist K K ′ = (ki + kc)− kc + km = (ki + kc) + 2km − k < γ + 2δ − k.
In our Coq development, this reasoning is done directly in the proof that the
reduction is correct, since it is quite simple, relying only on simple properties
of boolean operations and linear arithmetic facts, proved automatically using
omega.
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For example, with γ = k and δ = k/2, we have emax = k. This is a tight
bound, in the sense that it can be reached, but it does not bring much information
about K: in general, guessing K from K ′ with dist K K ′ < k is essentially as
hard as guessing from scratch the positions of the k bits set in K. Fortunately,
we can extract much more information, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 4 (Xor analysis.ki km). The quantities ki and km can be derived
from ka and e, since we have ki =
e+ka−k
2
and km =
e+k−ka
2
.
Proof. Follows immediately from ka = ki + kc = ki + (k− km) and e = ki + km.
Definition 1 (Reduction). Given an attack A on the mark, we build an attack
on the key by starting with the estimated key K ′ corresponding to the attack on
the mark, guessing randomly an error 0 ≤ e < emax, deducing ki and km, and
guessing the correction of K ′ according to those parameters.
A′ A O′
def
=


let O′′ = A O′ in
let K ′ = O′ ⊕O′′ in
let ka = dist O
′ O′′ in
let e = random int emax in
let ki = (e+ ka − k)/2 in
let km = (e+ k − ka)/2 in
return (correct K ′ ki km)
Note that A′ can be enhanced to not consider values of e which yield non-
integer ki and km. We do not care to do it here since this would not change
asymptotic results.
Lemma 5 (Xor analysis.reduction).
∀A. P(unmark A) ≤ emax ×
(
γ
⌈γ/2⌉
)
×
(
n− k + δ
δ
)
× P(find mask (A′ A))
Proof. We consider an execution, introducing O, K, O′, then executing A′ A O′.
With probability P(find mask (A′ A)) we’ll obtain an unmarked copy O′′ from
A O′. Then, the correct error dist K K ′ will be guessed with a probability of
one in emax, and the correct values for ki and kc will follow from it. Finally,
correct K ′ ki km will return K with a probability of one in(
ka
ki
)
×
(
n− ka
km
)
It only remains to bound those two terms independently of ki, km and ka, using
monotonicity properties of the combinatorial function and assumptions on our
parameters and on the success of the unmarking attack.
Theorem 1 (Xor analysis.robustness).
∀A. P(unmark A) ≤
emax ×
(
γ
⌊γ/2⌋
)
×
(
n−k+δ
δ
)
(
n
k
)
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 2 and 5.
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3.5 Asymptotic behavior
We now show that the bound derived in Theorem 1 is negligible, i.e., that it
is eventually bounded by a negative exponential. This standard practice with
security bounds is less relevant in watermarking than, for example, in cryptog-
raphy, because the size of our secret key is fixed. Thus, a precise expression of the
bound may be more useful in practice than an asymptotic over-approximation.
Nevertheless, addressing the latter is an interesting challenge in terms of formal
proofs. In order to achieve this last part of our formalization, we made use of an
experimental new formalization of R+ built on top of U in which a real number
is represented as a pair with an integral part in nat and a fractional part in U.
In the following, we are going to study the behavior of our bound for n large
enough. To do so, we need some information on how other parameters grow with
n. We shall essentially assume that those parameters are linear in n, which is
the standard choice in practice. Formally, we suppose the following, assuming
constants 0 < α < 1, c ∈ N∗, e ∈ R and g ∈ R∗:
k/n ≤ α (2)
(n/k)c ≥ 4 (3)
emax ≤ e× n (4)
k − δ ≥ n× g + ⌊γ/2⌋ × c (5)
The last assumption is formulated in an ad-hoc fashion, but it essentially
requires that the difficulty of the attack is large enough and growing linearly
with n. Indeed, it quantifies the gap between the maximum number of bits that
can be attacked (γ) and the minimum that has to be changed in order to evade
detection (k − δ).
When all parameters are linear, we can always determine α, c and e. However,
a suitable value for g in (5) can only be found when k − δ > ⌊γ/2⌋ × c. For
example, suppose we want to mark k = ⌊n/100⌋ bits with a detection threshold
δ = ⌊n/200⌋. We can take c = log(4)/ log(100), and assumption (5) roughly
requires that γ is less than six times k − δ. Thus, our hypotheses still allow us
to cover a satisfyingly wide range of attacks. Our asymptotic bound will become
tighter when the attack is made more difficult, i.e., γ is made smaller relative to
k − δ.
Lemma 6 (Asymptotic.final). There exists β ∈ R+∗ and m ∈ N such that
for any n ≥ m,
emax ×
(
γ
⌊γ/2⌋
)
×
(
n−k+δ
δ
)
(
n
k
) ≤ α⌊βn⌋
Proof. We first show that:
emax ×
(
γ
⌊γ/2⌋
)
×
(
n−k+δ
δ
)
(
n
k
) ≤ emax × (2× 4⌊γ/2⌋)× (k
n
)k−δ
This is proved by approximating separately each term. For the second term, we
use the following precise bound: ∀k,
(
2k
k
)
≤ 4k. For the third term, we show that
(
n−k+δ
δ
)
(
n
k
) = δ + 1× . . .× k
(n− k + δ + 1)× . . .× n
=
δ + 1
n− k + δ + 1
×
δ + 2
n− k + δ + 2
× . . .×
k
n
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and we conclude by observing that we have k − δ increasing factors.
We choose β to be g/2, andm is chosen to be large enough so that 2×emax ≤
α−⌊gn/2⌋, which can always be obtained since emax is only linear in n by (4).
We obtain the following bound: α−⌊gn/2⌋ × 4⌊γ/2⌋ × ( kn )
k−δ. By assumption (3)
we can further enlarge this into α−⌊gn/2⌋ × (k/n)−c⌊γ/2⌋ × (k/n)k−δ. Using (5)
we obtain α−⌊gn/2⌋ × (k/n)⌊ng⌋ and we finally obtain α⌊gn/2⌋ by (2).
Corollary 1 (Asymptotic.robustness). Provided that assumptions (1-5) hold,
there exists β > 0 and m ∈ N such that for any n ≥ m,
∀A. P(unmark A) ≤ α⌊βn⌋
3.6 Substitution watermarking
We now consider marking by substitution. In this scheme, the secret key is made
of two parts: a maskM and a message K, both of the same length as the support
to be marked. Instead of flipping bits according to the mask as in the previous
scheme, bits of the support are replaced by those of the message at positions
indicated by the mask. Although the message contains irrelevant information (at
positions not set in the mask) in this presentation, this is not a problem for our
development.
genkey :=


let M = BVrandom k n k in
let K = BVrandom n in
return (M,K)
mark (M,K) O := (O&¬M) ‖(K &M)
#marks (M,K) O′ := |M &¬(K ⊕O
′)|1
Note that this scheme is blind, i.e., the detection method does not need
to refer to the initial support O as before. This property is the reason why
substitution is prefered to bit flipping in practice. Indeed, blind schemes allow
to delegate the search of marked copies to several agents without having to
communicate much information to those agents: When the secret key is generated
using a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) it suffices to communicate
the seed that was used to initialize it. Of course, this compression advantage
disappears in our theoretical setting; we discuss this in conclusion.
The definition of the robustness game unmark is the same as before, and it
turns out that we can derive the exact same bound as for bit-flipping water-
marking, under the same hypotheses on parameters n, k, δ and γ. The reason is
that although there is more information in the secret key, it suffices to guess the
mask M to obtain the (useful part of) the message K. Therefore the problem is
exactly the same as for bit flipping, the same reduction applies and we obtain
the same bound. Formally, the only change is in the definition of the secrecy
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game:
find mask A :=


let (M,K) = genkey in
let O = BVrandom n in
let O′ = mark (M,K) O in
let M ′ = A O′ in
return (M =M ′)
Lemma 7 (Substitution analysis.secrecy).
∀A, P(find mask A) ≤
(
n
k
)−1
Lemma 8 (Substitution analysis.reduction).
∀A. P(unmark A) ≤ emax ×
(
γ
⌈γ/2⌉
)
×
(
n− k + δ
δ
)
× P(find mask (A′ A))
4 Conclusion
We have given a robustness result for bit-flipping and substitution schemes
against arbitrary attackers, based on a new reduction to secrecy. This reduc-
tion and the associated proofs have been fully formalised in Coq on top of the
Alea library. Our work is one of the few large examples of using this library,
illustrating most of its key aspects with the notable exception of non-structually
recursive functions. In itself, our development totals around 900 lines of spec-
ification and 1500 lines of proofs. But it also required further developments of
Alea, including properties of binomial coefficients, a few dedicated tactics to
simplify expressions involving distributions, the integration of material about
discrete distributions adapted from Certicrypt and the development of the
library on positive real numbers (1100 lines of spec and 1700 lines of proofs).
Ignoring all the infrastructure work, the core of our development is satisfyingly
concise: each of the two robustness proof has only about 200 lines of proofs that
follow quite closely the informal presentation.
Our work could be pushed further in several directions. Now that basic water-
marking primitives have been formalised and proved robust, one could consider
formalising and proving more complex schemes and protocols. For instance, one
could prove the security of complete watermarking protocols built from robust
non-removable embeddings; Certicrypt would be a natural choice to formalise
existing proofs in that domain [9]. But there are also fundamental questions
which remain open even at the level of the basic embedding primitives. In some
contexts, it is relevant to consider repeated attacks, and one should study the
advantage that attackers can gain by having access to multiple supports marked
with the same key, or mutiple marked copies of the same support with differ-
ent keys. A related question will be to study the impact on robustness of non-
uniform distributions for supports, messages, and of other distortion measures
than Hamming distances. For example, in the context of watermarking numer-
ical databases, the meaningful notion of distance is based on query answers,
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which opens up the possibility of subsetting attacks that consist in removing a
few lines or columns from the database. There are techniques to prevent such
attacks, that could be formalised in our framework. Finally, a very important
question is the issue of pseudo-random number generators. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no formal security work that takes pseudo-random generators
into account. This is not a problem in many applications, since true randomness
becomes increasingly accessible from physical devices. However, as discussed in
the substitution watermarking section, pseudo-random generators are used as
a compression device in watermarking. Evaluating the security impact of this
practice is thus unavoidable, and promises to be very difficult.
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